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INTRODUCTION 
The paper is concerned with the question of how many hours per week individual women and men 
would want to spend performing paid work – with how they form their working time preferences. Until 
recently, working time preferences remained largely unexplored. In sociology, this largely owes to the 
discipline’s traditional focus on institutional constraints to employment in the attempt to explain variations 
in individuals’ and in particular women’s involvement with the labour market. Only of late have some 
scholars endorsed the neo-classical emphasis on individual choice and have begun to pay attention to 
what women and men want – i.e. to people’s preferences (e.g. Hakim 1991; Hochschild 1997). Also 
among economists, there is increasing awareness that the canonical model of labour supply, which is 
based  on  the  assumption  that  we  are  able  to  choose  the  number  of  hours  we  desire,  has  its 
shortcomings. Work behaviour is, inter alia, constrained by employer preferences and for this reason 
cannot be regarded as strict evidence for employees’ preferences (Blundell et al. 2005; Manning 2003). 
In short, the limitations of the ‘theory of revealed preferences’ (Samuelson 1948) are increasingly 
acknowledged by the wider research community. As a consequence, there is a growing interest in 
measuring and studying working time preferences themselves rather than inferring them from behaviour.  
Surveying the literature on working time preferences unearths a considerable body of empirical research 
on the frequent gaps between employees’ actual and desired hours of paid work (e.g. Altonji & Paxson 
1988; Bell & Freeman 2000; Bluestone & Rose 1997; Böheim & Taylor 2003; Clarkberg & Moen 2001; 
Dickens & Lundberg 1993; Drolet & Morissette 1997; Echtelt et al. 2006; Golden 2006; Jacobs & Gerson 
2004; McDonald et al. 2006; Reynolds 2003; 2004; 2005; Reynolds & Aletraris 2006; Sousa-Poza & 
Henneberger 2001; Stewart & Swaffield 1997; Stier & Lewin-Epstein 2003). Studies of this kind have 
challenged  one  of  the  basic  assumptions  of  microeconomic  labour  supply  theory,  namely  that 
individuals are free to choose the number of hours they work. There is consistent evidence that in the 
European Union (Bielenski et al. 2002; Fagan 2002) as well as in other industrialised countries (Bell & 
Freeman 2000; Sousa-Poza & Henneberger 2001; Drolet & Morissette 1997; Dickens & Lundberg 
1993; Reynolds & Aletraris 2006) many workers are dissatisfied with the length of their current work 
week. In Europe, roughly every second employee faces an ‘hours mismatch’
1.The vast majority of these 
constrained workers are overworked, i.e. they are currently working more than they would prefer to. 
A second strand of research that draws on subjective working time preference data is concerned with the 
predictive value of such data. A number of longitudinal studies provide empirical evidence confirming that 
stated desires for work time adjustments among employees are significant predictors of future changes 
in their actual hours worked (Böheim & Taylor 2004; Euwals 2001a; Euwals et al. 1998; Euwals 2005). 
Moreover, these studies suggest that constraints set by employers are a major factor in the creation of 
the frequent mismatches between actual and preferred hours of work. Such conclusions are based on 
findings that show that workers who change their employers are more likely to adjust their working hours 
in the preferred direction (e.g. Blundell et al. 2005; Baaijens & Schippers 2005; Euwals 2001b). The 
                                                 
1  Drawing on data from the British Household Panel Survey, Böheim and Taylor (2003) find a dissatisfaction rate with current 
hours of 40% (share of respondents who indicate to prefer to work fewer or more hours than at present). Holst and Schupp 
(2002), who draw on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel report a dissatisfaction rate of 48% (the presence of an 
hours mismatch was defined as working two hours more or less than desired). Fagan (2002), drawing on data from the 
European Foundation, reports a dissatisfaction rate of 63% for the EU plus Norway (see also Bielenski & Wagner 2004).     3 
establishment of the predictive value of working time preferences for adjustments in hours supplied over 
time and especially their greater predictive power in situations that involve a change of employer gives 
credence to the assumption that such preferences have an intentional component (validity criterion). 
Whilst there is a substantial body of research on the determinants and consequences of the frequent 
mismatches between preferred and actual hours of work, very few studies have directly addressed the 
theoretically prior question of how people form their working hours and have explored the factors that 
may determine the number of hours individuals prefer to work (e.g. Bielenski et al. 2002; Drago et al. 
2006).  Moreover,  previous  studies  on  individual  labour  supply  decisions  have  almost  exclusively 
modelled actual work hours and not individuals’ labour supply preferences as such. In part, this may 
be due to the type of preference data available. In many surveys, respondents are asked whether or 
not they would like to adjust their hours in an upward or downward direction but they are not asked 
about the magnitude of their hours mismatch. In the absence of information on the number of hours by 
which employees would like to lengthen or shorten their current work week, such surveys do not 
provide  information  on  the  number  of  hours  individuals  would  like  to  work
2.  The  German  Socio-
Economic  Panel  is  among  the  very  few  studies  that  provide  a  direct  measure  of  working  time 
preferences and is used in this paper for a dynamic analysis of preferred labour supply.   
Furthermore, intrinsic job quality remains absent from the mainstream of labour supply theory as well as 
from most applied work in this area (Spencer 2004b).
3 Arguing that the conventional model of labour 
supply may for this reason (i.e. due to an omitted variables bias) lead to erroneous conclusions with 
regard to the determinants of individuals’ labour supply preferences, the present study develops an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework that combines the microeconomic model of labour supply with 
alternative theories of work motivation; i.e. with a motivational theory of work behaviour that also takes 
account of the intrinsic rewards of paid work as important factors in work motivation. 
In sum, the aim of this study is to carry out an empirical analysis of individuals’ labour supply decisions, 
that differs from the mainstream of economic research on labour supply in at least four respects: first, 
we look at stated preferences regarding the desired amount of paid work rather than at revealed 
preferences (i.e. the number of hours actually worked); second, we take account of the intrinsic quality 
of work as an important component of work motivation; third, we aim to account for the fact that 
preferences are formed in a context of structural and cultural constraints and that they may thus be 
‘adaptive’ rather than reflecting ‘ideal choices’ of homo economicus; and fourth, we acknowledge that 
the process of preference formation may vary across socio-economic contexts. This interdisciplinary 
model of working time preference formation is tested against longitudinal data that was collected in 
Germany in the time between 1993 and 2003. Separate analyses are carried out for the Old and New 
Länder. This comparative approach affords us with the opportunity to assess mediating effects of 
different socio-economic and gender cultural contexts on preference formation processes. The rest of 
                                                 
2 This is, for instance, the case with the British Household Panel Study and the Swedish Level of Living Survey, which simply ask 
whether respondents want to work more, fewer or the same number of hours when compared to how much they work now. 
3 From the neoclassical point of view, the value of different job attributes is determined on the market as a compensating differential. 
For this reason, (most) economists do not tend to take a prior view on value of different job attributes for workers (Green 2006). Yet, 
today there are a number of economists who argue for the importance of intrinsic job quality as a determinant of economic behaviour 
(e.g. Lane 1991; 1992; Kaufman 1999; Altman 2001; Clark 2001; 2005; Spencer 2004a; 2004b; Green 2006).   4 
the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  The  next  section  introduces  the  theoretical  framework  and 
discusses the main research hypotheses. This is followed by a presentation of the data used and the 
analytical methodology applied. The hypotheses are put to an empirical test using longitudinal data. 
After the presentation of the results, the study ends with a discussion of its principal conclusions.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Researchers differ with respect to how they conceptualise working time preferences. Economists tend 
to model stated preferences over work hours as a utility function in terms of leisure and income, based 
on the assumption that preferred hours were, apart from the budget constraint, not affected by any 
other restrictions (e.g. Euwals & van Soest 1999). Bielenski and colleagues (2002), by contrast, view 
working  time  preferences  as  the  result  of  ‘compromises  between  what  is  desirable  and  what  is 
feasible’. We adopt this notion of ‘bounded’ preferences, assuming that preferences over work hours 
are shaped by constraints such as economic necessities, domestic responsibilities, and, less tangibly, 
by social norms about how people should use their time (Fagan 2001). We thus expect that they can 
only partly be explained under the assumption of utility-maximizing behaviour.  
In this study, working time preferences (henceforth interchangeably used with the among economists 
more commonly used term ' labour supply preferences' , cf. Altonji & Paxson 1988; Böheim & Taylor 
2003)  are conceptualised  as the outcome  of an  optimal trade-off between  the financial  and  non-
financial rewards from paid work, on the one hand, and the utility gained from time spent in non-market 
activities, on the other, faced by individuals who are (factually or normatively) constrained by their 
need to earn a living (minimum paid work time) and to fulfil their out-of-work responsibilities (minimum 
non-market time). Hence, in contrast to neoclassical microeconomic labour supply theory, labour supply 
preferences are not viewed as representations of individuals’ ideal combination of income and leisure at 
a  particular  wage  –  as  being  entirely  determined  by  wage  rates  and  budget  constraints.  Instead, 
working time preferences are viewed as being shaped by the characteristics of individuals and their 
jobs, as well as by situational factors including individuals’ family situation and the welfare and labour 
market context,  in  which hours  decisions are mediated. Working time presences are moulded by 
individuals’ evaluation of what is possible in their current circumstances – financially and in terms of 
the time available for paid work. Furthermore, since individuals’ work- and home-related circumstances 
as well as the labour market and policy context, in which decisions over work hours are mediated, are 
temporally variable, working time preferences are not viewed as stable characteristics of individuals. 
On the contrary, they are expected to change over time.  
This notion of preferences strongly differs from what economists and rational choice theorists from other 
disciplines have in mind when postulating that preferences (or ‘tastes’) were fixed, exogenously given, 
and universal characteristics of individuals (e.g. Stigler & Becker 1977). In contrast to this view, and in 
line with other scholars who stress the social embeddedness of choice and the endogeneity of preferences 
(e.g. Sen 1973; Becker 1996; Bowles 1998)
4, we consider the study of preference formation important 
and, as a precondition, possible. That is, in contrast to the assumption of revealed preference theory, that 
                                                 
4 Although many economists would agree that preferences are not exogenously given; the study of preference formation tends to be 
viewed as not being useful for economics. It should be left to be investigated by scholars from other disciplines (Friedman 1962).    5 
preferences can only be read off from behaviour, we hold the view that stated preferences can be used 
as proxies for people’s ‘real’ preferences, and that the information that such preferences contain will be at 
least as closely if not more closely related to peoples’ real preferences than is observed behaviour.
5  
Individual level determinants 
The study is based on the assumption that individuals work for economic but also for non-economic 
reasons. In the terminology of needs theory of human motivation (Maslow 1943; Alderfer 1972; Lawler 
1973), people are motivated to engage in paid work in order to meet their material needs, on the one 
hand, and some of their higher-order needs for growth and self-development, on the other. Whether a 
job lends itself to the satisfaction of higher-order growth needs is argued to depend on the intrinsic 
rewards it provides. With the aim to relate work motivation to working time preferences, we thus focus 
on two work motives: monetary rewards and self-actualisation through the performance of intrinsically 
rewarding tasks. We expect that how many hours individuals prefer to work depends on how many 
hours they need or want to work for economic reasons and thus on their personal income target and 
hourly wage rate, and on the extent to which they experience the paid work they perform as an 
intrinsically rewarding activity. A more detailed account on the theoretical predictions about the impact 
of wages and of intrinsic job quality on preferred work hours is given in what follows.  
Our predictions with regard to wage and income effects build on the micro-economic concept of ‘target 
income behaviour (Camerer et al. 1997; Altman 2001), That is, our basic assumption is that individuals 
work to meet a predefined income or consumption level, or in other words, that they have a personal 
target income they aim to generate in gainful employment
i. Given that the amount of paid work that is 
necessary to reach one’s income target is a function of hourly wages, we thus hypothesise workers’ 
hourly pay rate to be inversely related to the number of hours they prefer to work, all else equal. We 
hence expect workers to prefer shorter hours when offered a higher wage, while in the event that their 
wage falls, they are expected to prefer an increase in work hours to compensate for the lower pay rate. 
When high pay rates lead to a reduction in the willingness to work long hours, because relatively few 
hours of work secure a high total income, this is what economists call the ‘income effect’. The application 
of the  ‘target income  logic’  implies that changes  in the pay  rate  are  generally  negatively related to 
changes  in  preferred  work  hours  (Bluestone  &  Rose  1998).  This  is  in  contrast  to  standard  micro-
economic labour supply theory which posits that higher wages can also have the opposite effect: the 
logic of opportunity costs implies that workers may be enticed to desire longer hours of work when 
offered a pay rise, because higher wages make the consumption of leisure more costly in terms of 
forgone income (‘substitution effect’). Competitive theory holds that above a certain income the income 
effect will dominate the substitution effect; i.e. rising wage rates will start to reduce labour supply. This 
results in the theoretical prediction of a ‘backward bending’ labour supply curve, which is positively sloped 
at lower wages but negatively sloped at higher wages (Bluestone & Rose 1998; Bell 1998). However, 
labour supply theory does not provide predictions about the circumstances under which the income 
                                                 
5 This argument is supported by Sen: ‘That behaviour is a major source of information on preference can hardly be doubted, but 
the belief that it is the only basis of surmising about people' s preferences seems extremely questionable. (…)The idea that 
behaviour is the one real source of information is extremely limiting for empirical work and is not easy to justify in terms of the 
methodological requirements of our discipline’ (1973: 257-258).   6 
effect can be expected to outweigh substitution effects (e.g. Altman 2001). The issue of how wages and 
working hours are, in reality, related is left to empirical rather than theoretical work. Yet, to date, empirical 
research has not resolved the issue either (Blundell & MaCurdy 1999; Kimball & Shapiro 2003).  
As mentioned, the application of the ‘target income logic’ implies the theoretical expectation that changes 
in the wage rate are, in general, negatively related to changes in preferred work hours. Hence, in contrast to 
neoclassical labour supply theory, we do not expect preferred work hours to increase with the wage in the 
lower part of the wage distribution. As also argued by Spencer (2004a), it makes perfect sense in applied work 
not to expect such substitution effects, as it appears implausible to assume the reverse, i.e. that low-wage 
workers will desire a reduction in paid work hours when they face wage cuts. The intuitively more satisfying 
thesis, namely that workers whose real wages decline, are willing to work more hours in order to recoup 
some of their lost purchasing power, receives empirical support (Scacciati 2004)
ii. In sum, based on the 
concept of ‘target income behaviour’, we expect wage increases to result in preferences for shorter hours; 
conversely, decreasing wage rates are expected to trigger an increase in the number of preferred hours. 
H1a: An increase in their wage rate, ceteris paribus, leads workers to reduce the number of hours they prefer to 
allocate to paid work, and vice versa [underlying assumption: individuals set an income target whose 
attainment is faster at the higher wage rate; ‘target income hypothesis’].  
The target income logic also implies that preferred hours should theoretically rise with the income target. 
Individual’s preferred hours are thus expected to increase with the number of financially dependent family 
members (e.g. non-working partner, children), and conversely, to decrease with the level of non-labour 
income. Given that women are less likely to act as the main breadwinner in families than their male 
partners, an increase in the household target income is less likely to affect women’s labour supply 
preferences than men’s. Hence, against the backdrop of traditional gender relations, we would expect 
the arrival of children to affect men’s preferences mainly via financial considerations (increase in target 
income), whilst for women the presence of small children is more likely to operate as a time constraint 
(e.g. Charles & James 2003). Based on this reasoning, we expect the average German woman to prefer 
shorter hours of paid work in the presence of small children due to her role as the primary caregiver, 
while we expect her male partner to prefer longer hours of work upon the arrival of children, as he will 
often resume the main responsibility for the attainment of the household’s target income. However, 
differences between East and West Germany in the extent to which this scenario takes place are likely to 
occur due to varying levels of institutional and cultural support for maternal employment and as a result of 
differences in economic conditions. There are various reasons for why we would expect to find a weaker 
negative child effect for East German women than for their West German counterparts. First, in East 
Germany  childcare  facilities  are  more  strongly  tailored  to  the  needs  of  full-time  working  mothers 
(Engelbrech & Jungkunst 2001). Second, the gender cultural background tends to be more favourable 
towards the paid work involvement of mothers in East than in West Germany (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). 
And third, wages tend to the lower in the Eastern part of Germany while unemployment rates are much 
higher leading to a situation in which many mothers may have to work for economic reasons. In contrast, 
in West Germany a higher share of women may be able to afford not to work or to work reduced hours 
and may hence be more likely to reduce their preferred hours upon the birth of a child. Among men,   7 
we expect the arrival of children to lead to preferences for longer hours of paid work not least because 
they have to compensate for the loss in family income in the event that their partners reduce their paid 
work involvement. Given that West German women are more likely to quit employment upon the 
arrival of children (Rosenfeld et al. 2004), we may thus expect the child effect on men’s preferred 
hours to be more strongly positive in West than in East Germany.  
H1b: An increase in their target income, ceteris paribus, will lead workers to increase the number of hours they prefer 
to work [workers’ target income is assumed to rise when the number of people dependent on their income 
increases or when their non-labour income decreases, all else being equal].  
The assumption that individuals will always prefer to work less when they can afford to do so implies that 
they have a preference for leisure over time spent at the workplace; i.e. that that they generally view the 
performance of paid work as a disutility. In contrast to this view, we assume that workers do not only 
derive utility from consumption and leisure, but that they may also derive utility from the act of labour 
itself, especially when it offers opportunities for personal development and initiative (Kohn & Schooler 
1983). Hence, we take account of the quality of the time spent at the workplace as a potentially important 
factor in shaping peoples’ labour supply preferences. There is a great deal of consensus in the literature 
regarding the proposition that intrinsically rewarding work tasks and certain job characteristics such as 
discretion and decision latitude will elicit work motivation and may thus encourage individuals to work 
more/harder (Hackman & Oldham 1976). Moreover, according to Alderfer’s theory of work motivation 
(1972),  intrinsically  rewarding  and  challenging  work  perpetually  increase  people’s  desire  for  self-
actualisation, personal development and advancement in their jobs. Based on the reasoning that task-
related rewards such job autonomy and feelings of competency can only be ‘consumed’ and enhanced 
when working; and that professional success and the further development of skills require a high level of 
intensive and extensive work effort, we would thus expect workers in higher quality jobs to prefer longer 
hours  of  work  than  their  counterparts  in  lower-quality  jobs,  whose  performance  is  less  likely  to  be 
intrinsically rewarding. From a more dynamic perspective, we thus expect workers who move from lower 
to higher quality jobs, and hence from less to more growth needs satisfaction, to increase their preferred 
number of work hours, all else equal. Intrinsic job quality is understood as being determined by the 
nature of the work tasks involved when performing a job. The level of skill, job autonomy, task discretion 
and the extent to which the job permits self-development and advancement are usually seen as central 
factors determining the quality of a job (e.g. Gallie 1997; Clark 2005; Green 2006; Rose 2003).  
H2:  Workers who move from lower to higher quality jobs with greater intrinsic rewards, ceteris paribus, will 
increase the number of hours they prefer to work, and vice versa. 
Theoretical predictions about the relative importance of different factors as determinants of labour supply 
preferences can be made based on needs theories of human motivation
iii. One of the best-known of 
these theories is Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943), which posits that human needs can be arranged 
hierarchically, with individuals being motivated to satisfy them one step at a time beginning with their 
material needs. Based on this logic, the expectation would be that before the goal of securing material 
needs is achieved; other factors such as whether individuals enjoy performing their jobs play a minor role   8 
(cf. Sen 2000; Stewart 2006). Therefore, we would expect those who struggle to obtain an income that 
allows for a decent standard of living, to mainly focus on the material rewards of work. They are thus 
expected to mainly work for monetary reasons and therefore to form their labour supply preferences 
according to the target income logic. Upon the attainment of their material needs, workers are held to 
progress  to  higher-order  needs.  According  to  Alderfer’s  version  of  needs  hierarchy  theory  (1972), 
however,  workers  can  also  move  in  a  downward  direction  (‘frustration  regression’).  Based  on  this 
reasoning, workers who are able to satisfy their material needs but do not have the opportunity to satisfy 
their higher-order growth needs at work are expected to ‘regress’ to the target income logic, i.e. the 
monetary rewards of work remain their primary motivation to work. Those who have attained material 
security and whose jobs allow growth needs to be gratified, by contrast, are expected to be motivated by 
the non-economic rewards of their jobs (performance of intrinsically rewarding tasks).  
An implication of this reasoning is that we would expect the strength of the ‘income effect’ deriving from 
the ‘target income logic’ to vary across workers, depending on their position in the hierarchy of needs. In 
particular, we would expect the strength of the ‘income effect’ to decline with the extent that one’s job is 
conducive to higher-order growth needs satisfaction. In other words, workers in high-quality jobs are 
expected to be less prone to desires for work hour reductions when their wages rise. Moreover, those in 
higher-quality jobs should be more likely to increase their preferred hours when the quality of their jobs 
improves than their counterparts whose jobs are less rewarding in intrinsic terms. This prediction derives 
from Alderfer’s contention that the intrinsic rewards of work increase in importance as sources of work 
motivation with the opportunity to satisfy them (‘the more one gets, the more one wants’).   
H3a: Material security decreases the likelihood that workers form their preferences according to the target income 
logic (c.f. H1a) but increases the likelihood that they form their preferences with view to non-economic factors 
and in particular to the quality of their jobs (c.f. H2).  
H3b: The likelihood that workers form their preferences according to the target income logic (c.f. H1a) declines 
with their opportunities to satisfy their growth needs at work, i.e. with the intrinsic quality of their jobs.  
H3c: The likelihood that workers form their preferences with view to the quality of their jobs (c.f. H2) increases with 
their opportunities to satisfy their growth needs at work, i.e. with the intrinsic quality of their jobs.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the view that we can classify jobs into high- and low-quality jobs with the 
former not only involving work tasks of higher intrinsic quality and better working conditions, but also 
higher pay than the latter, we acknowledge that wage increases may often but do not necessarily 
always come along with increases in intrinsic job quality. As suggested by the theory of compensating 
differentials, pay rises may even accompany deteriorations in job quality, when workers who switch to 
jobs with poorer working conditions or task quality are compensated for their ‘job disamenities’ with 
higher pay (Rosen 1974; 1986). Against this backdrop, we expect the effect of wage changes on 
workers’  preferred  hours  to  be  mediated  by  the  respective  developments  in  terms  of  job  quality. 
Employees who experience upward mobility in terms of an increase in hourly wages and in terms of 
job quality are expected to be less likely to reduce the number of hours they prefer to work following 
the pay rise than their counterparts who get a pay rise without experiencing an increase in job quality.    9 
Finally, while most economists assume labour supply decisions to have the same dynamics across 
countries,  motivational  theory  implies  that  we  may  find  important  regional  variations  in  the  ways 
employees form their working time preferences. In particular, we argue that the target income logic 
should be more salient where low-wage work is more prevalent and where the gratification of material 
needs is more precarious, or in other words, where workers tend to be lower on the hierarchy of needs 
(e.g. in the present context, in the Eastern part of Germany, where wages tend to be lower and where 
workers face a greater risk of jobs loss and especially long-term unemployment than in the Western part 
of Germany). Conversely, we expect job quality to be of greater determining importance where a higher 
share of workers can securely gratify their material needs by working a moderate amount of hours (i.e. 
greater prevalence of intrinsic work motivation in the more affluent Western part of Germany).  
 
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Data and population sample  
We use  data from eleven  waves  of the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel (GSOEP 1993-2003). The 
GSOEP is a representative panel study of German households, which have been surveyed annually 
since 1984, when about 12,000 people aged 16 and older participated. After German reunification, the 
survey was extended by about 4,500 persons from the New Länder (Haisken-DeNew & Frick 2003). The 
GSOEP contains a continuous measure of working time preferences. The relevant question, which is 
asked of all those in employment, reads: If you could choose your own number of working hours, taking 
into account that your income would change according to the number of hours: How many hours would 
you want to work a week? Owing to the fact that only those who have been in paid work at the time of 
interview have been asked about their working time preferences, the focus of our analyses is on the 
working population. Excluded from our sample are the self-employed, those working in the agricultural 
sector and those holding a second job.
iv Moreover, the analyses are restricted to the German population 
of ‘core working age’. We exclude those younger than 25 and those older than 60 from the analyses, 
because the preferences of people outside the 25-60 age group are likely to be co-determined by factors 
that are not dealt with in the present study (e.g. the organisation of the education and retirement system).  
Analysis of preference change 
The average number of working hours that Germany employees prefer to supply to the market shows 
little variation over time
6. A look at the individual level, however, reveals that between 2002 and 2003 
about 30% of male and about 35% of female workers increased or decreased their preferences by at 
least five hours (see Annex Table 1 for transition matrix). Decomposing the variation in preferred hours 
over the period under study into the variation across individuals and the variation ‘within’ individuals over 
time, we find the second component to be substantial and indeed stronger than the cross-sectional 
variation among male workers and East German women (see Annex Table 2). In sum, a first descriptive 
analysis suggests that although little temporal variation in working time preferences is discernible at the 
                                                 
6 Looking at dependent employees aged between 25 and 60, excluding those holding second jobs or working in agriculture, between 
1993 and 2003, the average number of preferred work hours (weekly) ranged from 37 to 39 among West German men, from 38 to 40 
among East German men, from 28 to 30 among West German women and between 34 and 36 hours among East German women. 
In none of these groups can a straightforward pattern of increase or decline in aggregate preferences over time be detected.     10 
aggregate level, there seems to be a great deal of change over time at the individual level. The question 
is: what makes individuals change their preferences over time? The following analysis of preference 
change focuses on the potential effects of family-cycle transitions, on the one hand, and on the effects 
of occupational mobility, on the other. Performing separate analyses for West and East Germany, we 
also attempt to assess a potential mediating effect of the socio-economic context in which working 
time preferences are formed. Moreover, as women’s preferences are hypothesised to be differently 
determined than men’s, we estimate separate models for women and men. 
Analyzing the effect of wages on preferred hours, there is the potential problem that wages might be 
endogenous due to the omission of variables that affect both wages and working time preferences. For 
instance, those who have preferences for longer hours than others may at the same time be more likely 
to have higher earnings due unobserved motivation or ability. This would lead to an upward bias in the 
estimated effect of hourly wages on preferred hours. In a similar vein, a positive impact of job quality on 
preferred hours may partly stem from self-selection of those with preferences for longer hours into higher-
quality jobs. In cross-sectional analyses, we cannot be sure whether employees are in higher-quality jobs 
because they (prefer to) work longer hours or whether it is indeed the other way around. If self-selection 
biases our results in this way, we may overestimate the positive effect of job quality on preferred hours. 
Given that we have the opportunity to draw on panel data, we can use repeated observations in the time 
dimension to deal with the omitted variables problem, i.e. to eliminate some of the potential bias that is 
due to unobserved heterogeneity. If we assume unobserved characteristics of individuals such as their 
general  work and career commitment  or the  importance  they  attach to  leisure  to  be  time-invariant, 
representing permanent properties of individuals, at least during the observation window, panel data 
analysis allows us to control for the possibility that more work-oriented employees prefer longer hours of 
work and at the same have better jobs and/or earn higher incomes rather than job quality and hourly 
wages having a ‘causal’ effect on preferred hours. In the analyses, we use fixed effects estimators, which 
exploit variation over time as a means to purge such time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Models and estimation methods 
Our sample consists of individuals aged between 25 and 60, who were observed at one or more of the 
eleven waves of the GSOEP between 1993 and 2003 to be dependently employed and to report working 
time preferences. Excluded from the sample are agricultural workers and second job holders. We adopt 
a typical specification of labour supply where preferred hours of work are related to the wage rate, other 
sources of income and a set of control variables. In addition, however, we include a measure of intrinsic 
job quality. We use the following model, where i indexes individuals and t indexes time periods. Pit is the 
weekly number of hours of paid work preferred by individual i in year t. Wit are hourly wages, Qit is a 
measure of job quality, Xit is a vector of time-varying regressors including respondents’ age, the length of 
job tenure with the current employer, health status, the presence of a cohabiting partner, the number 
of children of different ages and non-labour income. To control for aggregate effects (e.g. business 
cycle), we include  year dummies in all models (￿t). Finally, we include a time-invariant individual-
specific error component (￿i) and the classical time-varying idiosyncratic error term (￿it).  
 
Pit=Witß1 + Qitß2 + Xitß3 + ￿t + ￿i + ￿it   i=1, 2 ...N    t=1, 2 ...T    (1)   11 
The restriction of our sample to those currently employed will lead to biased estimates should there be 
a selection process driving the decision to participate or not in the labour market. To account for the 
potential impact of sample selection bias deriving from the fact that we only observe preferred hours 
for those who are working more than zero hours at the time of interview, we model the selection into 
employment. In the selection equation, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the 
individual was working at time t (sit=1) or not (sit=0). The predictors are a set of time-varying (X2it) 
regressors
7 some of which are common to those contained in Xit in the equation of interest (1). In 
detail, we include the number of children in different age groups, the presence of a cohabiting partner, 
the  level  of  non-labour  income,  age  in  linear  and  quadratic  form  and  subjective  health  status. 
Furthermore, to aid identification, we add predictors that are specific to the selection equation, namely 
a summary measure of the years spent in schooling and training and a dummy variable representing 
the employment status of the individual in the year prior to the study wave (working or not working). 
This approach is consistent only under the assumption that unobserved individual heterogeneity is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the selection equation. To overcome this assumption, 
which is unlikely to hold especially regarding individuals’ employment status in the previous year, we 
use a Mundlak-type approach and include the within-groups mean of each of the explanatory variables 
on the right hand side of the selection equation. In other words, to allow the unobserved effects in the 
selection  equation  ￿i  to  be  correlated  with  the  time-varying  predictors  (X2it),  we  parameterise  ￿i 
assuming  it  is  a  linear  combination  of  the  time  averages  of  X2i  while  the  remaining  part  of  the 
unobserved effect (ci) is independent of X2i (Mundlak 1978). Probit estimation is then performed for 
each t on the equation obtained from inserting (3) into (2). 
Sit=X2itß1 + ￿i + ￿it     i=1, 2 ...N    t=1, 2…T        (2) 
￿i= ￿0 + X2i’￿ + ci     X2i’=time averages of X2i        (3) 
Tests for sample selection bias are achieved using a method proposed by Wooldridge (2002: 581f). 
To  test  whether  the  sample  for  whom  sit=1  differs  systematically  from  those  for  whom  sit=0,  we 
compute inverse Mills ratios (IMRs
8) from a probit estimation of the selection equation for each time 
period t. The wave-specific IMRs are then stacked by i and t to form an additional regressor in the 
equation of interest (1). The test for selection bias then consists of a fixed effects estimation of the 
resulting model and a test of the restriction that the coefficient on the IMR is equal to zero
9.  
The estimation strategy is as follows: In a first step, we estimate the model of interest (1) by pooled OLS. 
Estimates will only be unbiased if all of the regressors are exogenous and if there is no sample selection 
bias. Second, under the assumption of ‘no sample selection bias’, we estimate a fixed effects model. The 
within-groups estimator is unbiased and consistent even if ￿i is correlated with the regressors. Hence, the 
use of fixed effects models allows us to account for the potential endogenous nature of hourly wages and 
job quality that is due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. However, in the event that selection 
                                                 
7 The fixed effects estimator cannot determine the effect of time-constant factors. However, time-constant regressors such as sex or 
residence in West or East Germany can be omitted, because the analyses are performed separately for these groups.  
8 The inverse Mills ratio is the ratio of the probability density function over the cumulative density function of a distribution. It reflects the 
effects of all unmeasured characteristics related to the employment decision. In the model of interest, it catches the part of the effect of 
these characteristics which is related to preferred hours. The test for sample selection is the Wald test. 
9 In addition to the IMR, we add interactions of the IMR with time dummies to allow for different correlations between the idiosyncratic 
errors in the selection equation and the equation of interest. Then, we test for the joint significance of these terms.   12 
into employment is systematically related to the idiosyncratic errors in the model (1), our fixed effects 
estimates may still suffer from sample selection bias. For this reason, in a third step, we explicitly test for 
sample selection bias using the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002) and outlined above. As is well-
established in the literature, especially in female labour supply models, sample selection bias is likely to 
be a problem. Hence, testing for its presence is important. It is important to remember, though, that 
selection  correction  procedures  only  promise  to  produce  consistent  estimates  provided  that  certain 
assumptions are satisfied and since some of these assumptions are likely to be violated in applied work, 
such procedures tend to reduce the precision of parameter estimates (Semykina & Wooldridge 2005). A 
drawback is the need for exclusion restrictions for the sample selection, i.e. the difficulty in finding 
variables  that  affect  the  selection  process  but  do  not  affect  the  outcome  of  interest.  Against  this 
backdrop, in the event that tests suggest that selection plays a role, we produce sample selection bias 
corrected estimates. These are mainly used to get an idea of the ways in which sample selection may 
bias our results but are otherwise interpreted with the necessary caution.  
 
Variable specification 
A continuous measure of working time preferences is available for each wave between 1993 and 2003 
except for the year 1996 when this variable has for some reason not been measured (for details on item 
wording, see above). Our measure of hourly wages is constructed by dividing the usual net monthly pay 
by usual monthly hours worked (including overtime). The former is deflated by the retail price index. This 
method  of  computing  hourly  wages  may  suffer  from  measurement  error  as  any  error  either  in  the 
measurement of hours or pay will be transmitted to the construction of hourly wages. To mitigate this 
problem,  cases  with  hourly  wage  estimates  that  are  at  the  very  high  or  low  end  of  the  earnings 
distribution (i.e. the first and last percentile) have been excluded, thus arriving at a wage estimate that 
ranges from four to fifteen Euros per hour. Yet, efforts to delete outliers in the wage distribution are no 
remedy  for  the  potential  endogenous  nature  of  wages,  which  may,  in  addition  to  unobserved 
heterogeneity that we can control for, also stem from measurement error. In the econometrics literature 
wage endogeneity is usually dealt with by using two-stage least squares estimation. However, this poses 
the difficulty of finding proper instruments for hourly wages, i.e. finding predictors of wages that do neither 
affect selection into employment nor working time preferences. Owing to these difficulties, we test for the 
potential endogeneity of hourly wages and discuss the direction of bias that such endogeneity may 
produce but do not aim to present estimates that actually correct for potential biases.  
As direct measures of task quality are not available for all waves, we need to draw on proxy measures. 
Candidates include an occupational prestige scale
10 and a measure of occupational autonomy. To 
determine which of the two measures available is more suitable as a proxy for job quality, we made 
use of the measures of task quality provided in the 2001 wave. In detail, we constructed a simple 
summative index focusing on the dimensions of task variety, task discretion and opportunities for 
personal development
11. Given that the measure of occupational autonomy correlates more strongly 
with the constructed index of task quality (r=0.5; p<0.001) than the occupational prestige scale (r=0.3; 
                                                 
10 This is a continuous index that offers an instrument for measuring hierarchical occupational status. 
11 Workers are asked whether it applies completely, partly or not at all that a) their job is varied, b) that they decide themselves how to 
complete the tasks involved in their work, and c) that they learn something new on the job, something that is relevant for their career.    13 
p<0.05), it was decided to use the former as a proxy measure of intrinsic job quality. This measure 
differentiates the categories civil servant, employee and worker, each of which is further differentiated 
according to the characteristics of work tasks. Civil servants are divided into those in lower, medium or 
higher civil service jobs, depending on the autonomy they enjoy in performing their jobs. Employees 
are sub-divided according to their level of responsibility into the following four groups: simple tasks, 
autonomous performance of difficult tasks under general supervision, autonomous performance of 
responsible tasks or limited responsibility for the tasks performed by others, and managerial tasks with 
decision-making power. Finally, workers are differentiated according to their education and training. 
They are divided into unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers and foremen. The final classification of 
job in terms of occupational autonomy is five-fold: 1) manual work with low autonomy, 2) employees in 
the production and services sector with little specialisation, 3) employees performing tasks that require 
a secondary level degree but involve limited responsibility, 4) employees performing tasks that require 
a tertiary degree but have low prestige, and 5) top managerial tasks and professionals with tertiary 
degrees and high prestige. This measure of occupational autonomy provided in the data increases 
with higher job quality in terms of variety, decision latitude and opportunities for further learning. The 
advantages of using this measure to capture changes in job quality instead of focusing on changes in 
the wage rate, as frequently done in the literature, are evident. An increase in hourly wages may but 
does not necessarily reflect a transition towards a job of higher intrinsic quality (e.g. Rosen 1986).  
To control for ‘non-labour income’, we include the net household income not earned by the respondent 
(Mincer  1962), alongside  a  dummy  indicating  partnership status (1=married/unmarried cohabitation). 
Moreover, we create a set of variables to capture the number and age distribution of children in the 
household (number of children a) aged up to one year, b) 2-4 years of age and c) aged 5-15).To account 
for sectoral differences in working time regulations,
12 we include a dummy indicating employment in the 
private or public sector. We also control for job tenure, i.e. the number of years that respondents have 
been working for the current employer. Conditional on age, this variable should capture the effect of work 
experience and specific on-the-job training. As health problems may also have a bearing on workers’ 
preferences, we control for respondent’s subjectively evaluated health status (1-bad health to 5-very 
good health). Finally, for the selection equation that models the participation decision (1=working; 0=not 
working) we draw on a continuous measure of qualifications, provided in the data
13. Furthermore, we 
model workers’ current employment status as a function of their respective status at time t-1.  
 
Results  
Table 1 presents the estimated effects of hourly wages, job quality and household composition on the 
number of work hours preferred by male and female employees in East and West Germany. For each 
of the groups analysed, the first column of results reports pooled OLS estimates (POLS), the second 
and third columns report fixed effects results for two different models (FE-1 and FE-2) and the final 
column presents estimates derived from a fixed effects regression including a test for sample selection 
                                                 
12 It was attempted to also control for the type of contract. However, this measure was not provided in all sample waves.  
13 This measure captures the sum of years of schooling and secondary occupational education. It counts the years of education and 
training that are institutionally assigned to the type of qualification obtained rather than the years actually spent in education.   14 
(FE+SS). The test for the significance of fixed effects (F-Test of ￿i = 0) suggests that person-specific 
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity plays a role in all analyses. Hence, OLS estimates are likely 
to be biased
14. This has some important and non-negligible consequences for some of our estimates:  
 
The estimated effects for the household variables are as expected. Married or cohabiting women tend 
to prefer fewer hours of work than single women, while partnered men tend to prefer longer hours than 
single men. In East Germany, only the OLS but not the FE-estimates of the partnership effect are 
significant, suggesting that partnered workers have some unobserved characteristics that are related 
to preferred hours (e.g. higher success in the marriage market for career-oriented men). There is a 
clear gradient across the effect of children on women’s preferences. Mothers tend to prefer fewer 
hours than childless women, with mothers of smaller children preferring fewer hours than mothers of 
older children. Moreover, in line with expectations, we find stronger negative effects of the presence of 
children for West than for East German women. Conversely, West (but not East) German men tend to 
prefer longer hours when they have children. Hence, our theoretical prediction that in West Germany, 
women (prefer to) reduce their paid work involvement to a stronger degree than in East Germany, 
while men have to compensate for the resulting reduction in household income by increasing the 
number of hours they prefer to work, receives empirical support. Non-labour income (in €100) is, as 
expected, negatively related to preferred hours, this effect being strongest for West German women.  
The second row of Table 1 reports the estimated effects of hourly wages. The pooled OLS estimates 
are negative and significant for all groups except for West German women. As outline above, in the 
event that the unobserved individual specific effect is positively correlated with preferred hours, we can 
expect the OLS estimates of wage effects to be biased upwards, however. Controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity (FE estimator) does not greatly change our estimates for men. For women, however, 
the OLS estimator seems to underestimate negative wage effects, suggesting that female employees, 
who possess characteristics which typically come along with higher wages, also tend to prefer longer 
hours of paid work. As a consequence negative wage effects are underplayed, or in the case of West 
German women, totally masked unless such unobserved characteristics are controlled for
15.   
Looking at the effect of job quality in terms of occupational autonomy, the OLS estimates suggest that 
those in higher-quality jobs tend to prefer longer hours of work. In the FE model, however, the job 
quality effects are estimated to be smaller and even turn out insignificant in the case of East German 
workers. This suggests that occupational autonomy is positively related with some unobserved factor 
that also comes along with preferences for a longer work week. In sum, for East German workers the 
results suggest that job autonomy has no effect on preferred hours. For their West German counterparts, 
by contrast,  positive effects of autonomy  are  estimated to  be smaller  in the FE  than in  the OLS 
specification but nevertheless remain highly significant (both for our male and female sample). 
                                                 
14 The fixed rather than the random effects specification was chosen due to the fact that the Hausman test rejected the hypothesis 
that individual effects are not correlated with the regressors (not shown).   
15 For West German men, we find significant effects of squared hourly wages. Their inclusion in the model does not change the 
coefficients for occupational autonomy, however. For all other groups, the coefficient for squared hourly wages is insignificant.    15 
In a next step, we test interaction effects between job quality and hourly wages to test whether workers 
who experience upward mobility in terms of an increase in wages and in occupational autonomy, are 
indeed less likely to reduce the number of hours they prefer to work following the pay rise than their 
counterparts who get a pay rise without experiencing an increase in job quality, as hypothesised. We 
find this prediction to hold in West but not in East Germany (FE-2, Table 1). The stronger the increase 
in occupational autonomy that occurs concurrently with an increase in wages, the weaker the negative 
wage effect on West German employees’ preferred hours is estimated to be.  
The last model in Table 1 presents estimates derived from a FE regression including a test for sample 
selection (FE+SS). To conserve space, the wave-specific cross-sectional selection equations are not 
reported. As indicated by the Wald test, which tests for the joint significance of the wave-specific 
inverse Mills ratios and their interactions with time dummies, sample selection bias is likely to be 
present for all but East German women
16. However, correcting for the indicated bias has a modest 
impact on the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables of interest (comparing FE-1 and 
FE+SS). In particular, the impact on the wage and job quality coefficients is rather small
17.  
After this analysis that related to average effects across the population, we test our hypotheses about 
potential divergences across the work force in the ways that labour supply preferences are shaped by 
wages and job quality. To this end, we split our sample into two segments on the basis of whether or not 
workers enjoy occupational autonomy. Then, we estimate the basic FE model shown in Table 1 (FE-1) 
once for workers who enjoy a high level of autonomy and once for workers who do not
18. As can be seen 
from Table 2, in line with our predictions, we generally find negative wage effects to be more strongly 
pronounced in our ‘low-autonomy sample’ (i.e. those in lower-quality jobs). Conversely, only those in 
higher-quality jobs seem to respond to changes in job quality. Running the same model once for workers 
who earn less than the average hourly wage (either in East or West Germany) and once for their 
counterparts in the upper half of the wage distribution (for details see footnotes below Table 2), we 
generally find negative wage effects to be less pronounced among workers in better paid jobs. Moreover, 
among West German workers we find the better-paid half of the workforce to respond with preferences 
for longer hours when the quality of their job improves, while this is not the case among their lower-paid 
counterparts. Overall, the findings suggest that the strength of negative wage effects generally decreases 
in strength with the level of job quality as well as with the level of pay. Conversely, job quality effects turn 
out to be stronger among those already in possession of ‘better jobs’ (in terms of job quality in both parts 
of Germany as well as in terms of pay in West Germany). These findings are in line with our theory that 
holds that those in higher quality jobs form their preferences more with view to job quality than their 
counterparts in lower quality jobs. Therefore, they are less likely to prefer work hours reductions when 
their wages increase but more likely to increase the number of preferred hours when the quality of their 
                                                 
16 The inverse Mills ratio (IMR), which reflects the effects of all unmeasured characteristics related to the employment decision, is 
shown to be a significant predictor of preferred hours. The IMR catches the part of the effect which is related to preferred hours.  
17 The wage estimates for men do not change. For women, the wage estimates seem to be downward biased, when we do not take 
account of selection effects. This suggests that non-active women may be willing to take up employment at higher potential wages, 
i.e. they would increase their preferred hours with wages rather than decrease it. Moreover, the model suggests that among West 
German women job quality effects may be somewhat overestimated. Unless this is due to scaling effects, this upward bias may stem 
from unobserved characteristics of non-working women that make them less responsive to job quality (e.g. home-centred women).   
18 The low-autonomy group includes manual workers with low autonomy and employees in the production and services sector with 
little specialisation (values 1 and 2 on the autonomy scale). The high-autonomy group includes workers performing tasks that require 
a secondary level or tertiary degree, professionals and top managers (values 3 to 5 on the autonomy scale).   16 
jobs increases. Conversely, those in lower quality jobs were expected to form their preferences primarily 
according to the simple target income logic, while being less likely to take account of job quality. Based 
on this reasoning, they should be more prone to reduce their preferred hours when their wages increase.  
In sum, our results suggest that changes in hourly wages are generally negatively related to changes in 
preferred hours. This holds for both sexes in both parts of Germany and tends to be more strongly 
pronounced among employees in lower quality jobs (in terms of occupational autonomy). Improvements 
in terms of job quality (occupational autonomy) tend to result in preferences for longer hours, especially 
among employees who are already in higher quality jobs. Yet, positive job quality effects are only found 
for West German workers and here especially among women, while the average East German worker 
does not seem to respond with preferences for longer hours when the quality of his or her job improves. 
This confirms our theoretical predictions about the mediating effect of the socio-economic context on 
preference formation processes. As argued, the average East German worker may be lower on the 
hierarchy of human needs than his or her West German counterpart due to an economic situation in the 
less affluent Eastern part of Germany, in which low levels of real wages necessitate the majority of 
employees to work rather long hours. Due to the fact that East German workers are hence less likely to 
have their material needs securely gratified, they should be less likely to progress to desires for higher-
order needs satisfaction at work as the main source of work motivation. However, while the average East 
German worker may be too low on the hierarchy of needs to consider the intrinsic quality of their jobs 
when forming his or her working time preferences, this is not the case for the advantaged segments of 
the East German labour force. Both in West and in East Germany, significant job quality effects can be 
discerned among workers enjoying a relatively high level of occupational autonomy (Table 2).  
Preference data is looked upon with a certain amount of scepticism by labour economists, who tend to 
build their work on the assumption that labour market behaviour can be taken as an expression of 
preferences (' revealed preferences assumption' , e.g. Stigler & Becker 1977). This instance encouraged 
us to replicate the investigation with actual hours worked as our dependent variable (see Tables 3 & 4). 
To preclude that differences in findings are due to differences in the samples investigated, we exclude 
those cases for which information on working time preferences is missing. Comparing the estimates for 
actual with those for preferred hours of work shows some interesting variations. Most centrally, while we 
failed to find job quality effects on East German workers’ preferences, we find their actual hours to 
significantly and substantially increase with the level of occupational autonomy they enjoy. This suggests 
that individuals extend or reduce their working hours, in part, in response to external factors that have no 
effect on their  preferences.  For instance,  a high  level  of job autonomy  often comes along  with the 
necessity to work longer hours. However, it seems that employees who are climbing up the career ladder 
to take jobs with increased autonomy would prefer to increase their work hours to a lesser extent than is 
suggested by their behaviour. Moreover, preferred hours seem to be differently determined than actual 
hours. In this analysis, health status turns out as a variable that helps to explain preferred but not actual 
hours
19. There  is reason  to believe that there  are other factors that  have this property,  i.e.  have  a 
stronger effect on preferences than on behaviour, but are as yet overlooked in labour supply research.  
                                                 
19 This is not to preclude the possibility that health affects actual labour supply under certain conditions or for certain sub-groups of the 
working population such as older workers or those experiencing strong health problems.   17 
Endogeneity of wages due to measurement error 
Wage effect estimates from empirical labour supply models, which assume exogenous wages, are often 
negative. Once researchers try to account for the potentially endogenous nature of hourly wages within a 
two-stage least squares framework, negative wage effects often disappear or even change the sign. This 
cannot be ignored here. What statistical procedures attempting to control for wage endogeneity basically 
do is to include predicted wages as a regressor instead of the potentially biased estimates obtained from 
dividing income by hours worked. However, the problem with such procedures is that they require valid 
and sensible instruments that are neither easy to obtain nor justify. The availability of panel data enables 
us to use lagged wages, which are typically argued to satisfy the criteria for valid instruments, for this 
purpose. Exchanging predicted for estimated hourly wages in the preferred labour supply model does 
away with any significant wage effects (not shown). This may arguably suggest that originally observed 
negative wage effects are an artefact of the data generated through an overestimation of hourly wages 
for those working short hours, and vice versa. Or less severe, it suggests that we may overestimate the 
magnitude of negative wage effects
v. Yet, we are reluctant to ascribe greater credibility to the findings 
produced by statistical procedures that aim to control for the potential measurement error in wages by 
predicting these on the basis of past wages and the other covariates in the model. As a matter of fact, the 
issue of how to correctly estimate wage elasticities is still unresolved, owing to the mentioned difficulties 
in finding suitable and theoretically justified instruments. At all events, the established job quality effects in 
this study are unaffected by potential problems of measurement error with regard to wages. Irrespective 
of the true direction of causation regarding wages, our central thesis that labour supply preferences are 
positively affected by the quality of work, receives empirical support. Moreover, when using predicted 
wages as covariates in our preferred labour supply models, we still find comparably stronger effects of 
transitions towards jobs with greater autonomy among West German women than among their male 
counterparts as well as stronger effects among those enjoying a higher level of autonomy already. 
Furthermore, even when we do not control for wages at all, we find positive effects of upward mobility in 
terms of occupational autonomy on preferred hours in West Germany (Annex Table 5). This is unlikely to 
be due to wage increases, as these have been found to be either negative or non-significant. Hence, the 
established effects of job autonomy can plausibly be interpreted as job quality effects.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The economic literature tends to support the view that empirical analyses of labour supply decisions and 
its determinants should be based on realised behaviour rather than on subjective preference data. This is 
built on the belief that it is only through actual behaviour that individuals will ‘reveal’ their true preferences. 
However, as suggested by studies that draw on preference data to investigate the extent that these 
diverge from actual behaviour, working hours are co-determined by employer preferences and therefore 
cannot be strictly interpreted as ‘revealed preferences’. There is thus good reason for examining the role 
of stated preferences for explaining the actual patterning of working hours, and hence this study has 
been concerned with employees’ preferences over work hours and how these are shaped.     18 
The main results regarding the effects of family life-cycle transitions can be summarised as follows: It is 
well-established in the literature that the presence of small children negatively affects women' s labour 
force activities (Uunk et al. 2005; Haas et al. 2006). Our analysis supports such observations and shows 
that the reduction in women’s paid work involvement following the arrival of children tends to be reflected 
in their preferences. Moreover, due to the fact that West German women are more likely to reduce their 
contribution to the household income upon the arrival of children than their East German counterparts, 
West German men were expected and indeed found to increase their preferred hours with the number of 
children, while this is not the case among their East German counterparts. 
With regard to out findings on the effects of occupational mobility, the results of this study suggest that it 
is not just the monetary rewards of work which determine the choice between work and non-market time; 
the quality of work exerts an independent influence on working time preferences. Moreover, it seems that 
on account of varying levels of ‘material security’ obtained by workers the salience of intrinsic work 
rewards as motivational determinants of preferred hours varies across different groups of workers. We 
found negative wage effects to be more pronounced for workers in lower-quality jobs than for their 
counterparts in higher quality jobs (proxied by level of occupational autonomy). Conversely, we found 
those already  in  high-quality jobs  to  increase  their  preferred  hours  when  intrinsic job  quality further 
improves, while those in low-quality jobs do not seem to respond with preferences for longer hours when 
they experience upward mobility to jobs with greater autonomy. In this context, we also expected to find 
regional differences. Owing to the fact that in the New Länder workers tend to have substantially lower 
wages than in the Old Länder, we expected fewer East than West German workers to be high enough 
on the hierarchy of needs as to be motivated to work by the intrinsic rewards of their jobs. In line with 
these predictions about the mediating effect of the socio-economic context on preference formation 
processes, our results suggest that increases in job quality tend to trigger an increase in employees’ 
preferred hours in West Germany, while this is not the case in the East. Hence, job quality indeed seems 
to be of greater importance as a determinant of labour supply preferences where a higher share of 
workers can securely gratify their material needs by working a moderate amount of hours
vi.  
The argument that the quality of the time individuals spend at the workplace is an important determinant of 
their motivation to work, and that thus the basis idea that the utility of leisure also depends on the quality of 
work time, has already been put forward by Jevons (1871) in the late 19
th century. This early attempt to 
illuminate the importance of non-economic aspects of work is in stark contrast to latter-day models of labour 
supply, in which the qualitative content of paid work is blinded out. As outlined by Spencer (2004b), it was 
the success of the notion of opportunity costs that contributed to the neglect of work quality in mainstream 
labour economics. In contrast to Jevons and others, the Austrian School of economics (e.g. Böhm-Bawerk 
1891; von Wieser 1892) decided not to assign theoretical relevance to the fact that workers may derive 
utility or disutility from the act of labour. Instead, they re-defined the cost of labour in terms of the loss of 
leisure time rather than in terms of the direct disutility or pleasure of work activities. The disutility of labour 
has thus come to be conflated with the utility of leisure. The theoretical implication of such a view is that 
workers are assumed to consider only the monetary rewards of work while being entirely indifferent toward 
its qualitative content. However, counter to the view that work is an instrumental activity people perform only 
to earn an income; it is well-established in the literature that the material rewards from work are not workers’   19 
sole inducement to supply labour. Workers do not work just in order to meet their consumption needs; they 
also retain interests in the quality of their work activities (e.g. Jahoda 1982; Gallie et al. 1998; Nordenmark 
1999; Hult & Svallfors 2002; Green & Tsitsianis 2005). Indeed, there is evidence that the majority of people 
would stay in the labour market even if this was not necessary for economic reasons (e.g. Warr 1982; Gallie 
et al. 1998; Svallfors et al. 2001). This suggests that employment offers a range of non-economic, on top of 
financial rewards. Especially when it offers scope for personal initiative and creativity, employment provides 
an important arena for self-fulfilment and personal development (Kohn & Schooler 1983; Lane 1991).   
We would therefore argue that there may be merits to re-including the quality of the time spent at the 
workplace as an independent factor in individual labour supply decisions. In a similar spirit as other 
commentators (e.g. Spencer 2004a; 2004b; 2006; Steedman 2000; Kaufman 1999; Altman 2001), we 
would  like  to  argue  that  research  on  labour  supply  may  profit  from  a  more  holistic  view  of  work 
motivation. Including work quality as a central aspect in the labour supply decision would have an 
important theoretical consequence: the taste for leisure would depend on the quality of work time.  
Finally, the analyses suggest that actual and preferred hours of paid work are differently determined, 
which supports the view that work behaviour does not reflect ‘revealed preferences’ and hence that 
investigating  working  time  preference  formation  processes  can  provide  valuable  insights  into  the 
mechanisms underlying observed labour supply outcomes. Most centrally, it seems that employees, who 
experience upward mobility, moving to jobs with increased autonomy, would prefer to increase their work 
hours to a lesser extent than what is suggested by their actual behaviour. This conclusion corroborates 
findings from  research, which suggests that it is the highly-skilled employees who are the most likely to 
work longer hours than they prefer (e.g. Stier & Lewin-Epstein 2003; Echtelt et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
preferred hours seem to be shaped by factors that have no or a different effect on behaviour. Health 
status is one factor that this study found to help explain preferences but not actual hours and there is 
good reason  to  believe that there may  be other factors that  have  this  property.  Factors  that  affect 
preferences but not actual behaviour may, for instance, include individual differences in the utility of 
leisure. Leisure may not be a normal good for all workers, i.e. increases in income may not always lead 
to a desire for additional leisure. First, what the study aimed to take into account is that the relative utility 
of leisure and work time is likely to depend on the quality of the time spent at the workplace. Workers’ 
subjective evaluation of the latter may be shaped by the quality of the job tasks they perform and the 
possibilities for further development provided but it may also depend on the quality of social relations at 
the workplace. Second, how much importance workers put on having leisure time may in addition to the 
quality of the time spent at the workplace also depend on the quality of their non-market time (e.g. 
satisfaction with family life, interest in leisure activities, quality of social network, etc.). A well-known 
example for this reasoning is the central thesis in Hochschild’s (1997) The Time Bind: some workers may 
experience the time spent at home as psychologically more strenuous than the time they spend at work 
and for this reason may be less willing to substitute work for leisure. Workers, who are dissatisfied with 
their out-of work-life, may be willing to give up an hour of their leisure time more readily than others.   
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Table 1: Pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates – the effects of German employees’ work and household situation on their working time preferences, 1993-2003 
  West Germany  East Germany 
  men  women  men  women 
  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS 
Age   -.01  .02  .02  .03  -.18***  -0.3  -.03  -.16***  -.05**  .00  .00  .05  -.03  .10  .11*  .20** 
Hourly wage  -.35***  -.26***  -.45***  -.26***  -.09  -.43***  -.69***  -.38***  -.32***  -.36***  -.29  -.36***  -.29**  -.46***  -.94**  -.36*** 
Occ. autonomy  .75***  .31***  .31  .26*  .95***  .55***  -.20  .38*  .52***  .29  .47  .13  .87***  .31  -.73  .33 
Autonomy*wage      .07**        .10**        -.03        .15   
Tenure  -.01  .01  .01  .02  .11***  .03  .03  .05  -.01  .00  .00  -.01  .00  -.06*  -.05  -.08* 
Public  -.76***  -.63*  -.63**  -.49  -.41  .00  -.01  -.20  -.56*  .09  .09  .05  -.34  .53  .52  .51 
Nr of kids 0-1  -.02  .05  .04  .17  -6.27***  -5.59***  -5.64***  -5.07***  .67  .37  .36  .56  -5.16*  -4.65**  -4.60**  -5.50* 
Nr of kids 2-4  .22  .30*
   .30*  .20  -6.25***  -4.48***  -4.50***  -3.77***  .00  .18  .17  .30  -3.29***  -3.29***  -3.28***  -3.25*** 
Nr of kids 5-15  .44***  .25**  .25**  .26*  -3.05***  -2.11***  -2.11***  -1.85***  .23  .18  .17  .21  -.85***  -1.04***  -1.03***  -.86*** 
Partner  .92***  .58*  .59*  .33  -1.65***  -1.67***  -1.66***  -1.49***  .88*  .84  .84  .30  -.88*  -.57  -.57  -.70 
Non-labour inc.  -.06***  -.04***  -.04***  -.03*  -.19***  -.09***  -.09***  -.08***  -.05*  -.03  -.03  -.03  -.09***  -.05*  -.05**  -.04 
Health    .18*  .22**  .23***  .21**  .22  .44***  .44***  .33**  -.04  .24  .24  .37*  .20  .41*  .41*  .53** 
Constant  40.67***  39.47***  41.32***  40.91***  41.10***  37.20***  39.14***  42.41***  43.18***  42.25***  41.71***  41.04***  39.46***  35.96***  39.09***  32.18*** 
Observations  20951  20951  20951  15691  14606  14606  14606  10519  6435  6435  6435  5580  4967  4967  4967  4161 
Respondents   6082  6082  6082  4766  4884  4884  4884  3729  1749  1749  1749  1524  1432  1432  1432  1231 
R-squared  .03  .01  .01  .01  .23  .07  .07  .06  .03  .02  .02  .03  .05  .03  .04  .04 
F-Test     3.46***  3.44***  3.69***    4.74***  4.72***  4.76***    3.23***  3.22***  3.14***    3.17***  3.18***  2.96*** 
Wald Test         sign        sign        sign        n.s. 
Year dummy variables are included in each procedure but not reported.  ‘POLS’ refers to pooled ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. FE refers to fixed effects estimation. ‘FE+SS’ refers to fixed effects estimation with 
correction for sample bias. The selection equation is not reported. The F-Test tests the significance of time-constant individual specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity). The Wald Test tests the joint significance of the inverse mills ratios and 
their interaction with time dummies.  ***p <.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05 
 
Table 2: Fixed effects estimates – the effects of German employees’ work situation on their working time preferences, by level of occupational autonomy, 1993-2003 
  West Germany  East Germany 
  men  women  men  women 
  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W 
Hourly wage  -.23***  -.32***  -.20***  -.47***  -.27***  -.57***  -.35***  -.53***  -.50***  -.55**  -.33*  -.56*  -.41***  -.73***  -.33**  -.34* 
Occ. autonomy  .60**  -.12  .30*  .12  .55**  .49  .54*  .03  1.04**  -.22  .43  .19  1.03*  .33  .38  -.17 
Observations  9803  11148  10561  10390  8354  6252  7179  7427  2932  2609  3183  3252  3497  1470  2586  2381 
Respondents   3348  3452  3799  3959  3012  2450  2879  3193  908  933  1082  1169  1040  631  833  950 
R-squared  .01  .01  .01  .01  .10  .03  .06  .04  .03  .02  .02  .02  .05  .02  .03  .04 
F-Test   3.83***  2.84***  3.80***  2.48***  4.42***  4.00***  4.73***  3.96***  3.79***  2.40***  3.14***  2.51***  2.95***  2.72***  3.22***  2.44*** 
Year dummy variables are included in each procedure but not reported.  Controls: all those contained in Table 36 except for health status. The F-Test tests the significance of time-constant individual specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity).   
(a) The sample includes professionals, managers and workers performing tasks that require at least a secondary degree (values 3-5 on the scale of occupational autonomy, while those with values 1 or 2 are in the low-autonomy group).  
(b) In each model, the sample was divided into two segments based on hourly wages. High-wage earners are defined as workers who earn the average wage level or more among each of the groups of employees considered.  
***p <.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05   21 
Table 3: Pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates – the effects of German employees’ work and household situation on their actual working hours, 1993-2003 
  West Germany  East Germany 
  men  women  men  women 
  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS  POLS  FE-1  FE-2  FE+SS 
Age   .07***  .13***  .13***  .20***  -.22***  -.10***  -.10***  -.06*  -.02  .09**  .09**  .08*  -.04  .02  .01  .06 
Hourly wage  -1.10***  -1.48***  -1.67***  -1.50***  -.43***  -1.40***  -1.57***  -1.46***  -.95***  -1.88***  -2.55***  -1.89***  -.92**  -1.94***  -1.72***  -2.02*** 
Occ. autonomy  2.95***  1.34***  .72***  1.13***  3.43***  1.52***  1.03***  1.28***  2.52***  1.04***  -.50  1.00***  3.95***  1.13***  1.60***  1.01*** 
Autonomy*wage      .07***        .06        .22***        -.07   
Tenure  -.02*  .01  .01  .01  .20***  .07***  .07***  .04  -.05**  .03*  .03*  .03*  .03  .02  .02  .00 
Public  -1.51***  -1.24***  -1.24***  -1.07***  -.73*  -.60*  -.60*  -.88***  -1.85***  -.73*  -.71*  -.84*  -.44  -.11  -.11  .14 
Nr of kids 0-1  .28  .81***  .80***  .79***  -7.88***  -7.38***  -7.42***  -5.60***  .27  -.06  -.01  .13  -7.27**  -.58  -.60  .18 
Nr of kids 2-4  .47**  .81***
   .80***
   .82***  -9.35***  -7.10***  -7.11***  -6.21***  .09  .65*  .70*  .64*  -4.70***  -3.23***  -3.23***  -2.53*** 
Nr of kids 5-15  .62***  .68***  .68***  .62***  -4.21***  -2.87***  -2.88***  -2.65***  .22  .38*  .41**  .40*  -.94***  -.87***  -.88***  -.74*** 
Partner  1.95***  .88****  .89***  .72**  -.87*  -.71***  -.70**  -.50  1.99***  .45  .45  .17  -.27  .32  -.32  -.13 
Non-labour inc.  -.07***  -.08***  -.08***  -.05***  -.23***  -.13***  -.13***  -.12***  -.03  -.08***  -.09***  -.07***  -.07**  -.07***  -.07***  -.03 
Health    .09  .07  .07  -.03  -.25  .00  .00  -.01  .23  .08  .08  .13  -.21  .05  .05  .09 
Constant  42.36***  47.80***  49.52***  45.06***  41.67***  47.76***  39.14***  47.25***  45.76***  51.98***  56.58***  52.84***  37.15***  50.48***  39.09***  49.50*** 
Observations  20951  20951  20951  15691  14606  14606  14606  10519  6435  6435  6435  5580  4967  4967  4967  4161 
Respondents   6082  6082  6082  4766  4884  4884  4884  3729  1749  1749  1749  1524  1432  1432  1432  1231 
R-squared  .17  .18  .18  .19  .35  .24  .24  .25  .13  .20  .20  .21  .17  .21  .21  .23 
F-Test     7.56***  7.46***  8.10***    10.50***  10.39***  10.99***    8..52***  8.45***  8.36***    10.05***  10.05***  8.78*** 
Wald Test         sign        sign        sign        sign 
Year dummy variables are included in each procedure but not reported.  ‘POLS’ refers to pooled ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. FE refers to fixed effects estimation. ‘FE+SS’ refers to fixed effects estimation 
with correction for sample bias. The selection equation is not reported. The F-Test tests the significance of time-constant individual specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity). The Wald Test tests the joint significance of the inverse mills 
ratios and their interaction with time dummies. ***p <.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05 
 
Table 4:  Fixed effects estimates – the effects of German employees’ work situation on their actual working hours, by level of occupational autonomy, 1993-2003 
  West Germany  East Germany 
  men  women  men  women 
  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W  high-A 
a  low-A  high-W 
b  low-W 
Hourly wage  -1.42***  -1.61***  -1.12***  -2.48***  -1.29***  -1.52***  -1.34***  -1.91***  -1.84***  -3.30***  -1.52***  -3.87***  -1.97***  -1.73***  -1.81***  -2.74*** 
Occ. autonomy  1.74***  .64***  .92***  1.33***  1.72**  1.72***  1.14***  1.35***  2.02***  .50  1.29***  .76***  1.05***  .73  .83***  1.50*** 
Observations  9803  11148  10561  3959  8354  6252  7179  7427  2932  2609  3183  3252  3497  1470  2586  2381 
Respondents   3348  3452  3799  10390  3012  2450  2879  3193  908  933  1082  1169  1040  631  833  950 
R-squared  .19  .19  .14  .19  .27  .18  .24  .17  .24  .21  .18  .22  .25  .15  .22  .14 
F-Test   6.81***  7.77***  8.07***  6.22***  8.08***  11.75***  10.86***  9.51***  8.73***  7.09***  9.12***  7.78***  9.43***  8.76***  10.05***  8.60*** 
Year dummy variables are included in each procedure but not reported.  Controls: all those contained in Table 38 except for health status. The F-Test tests the significance of time-constant individual specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity).   
(a) The sample includes professionals, managers and workers performing tasks that require at least a secondary degree (values 3-5 on the scale of occupational autonomy, while those with values 1 or 2 are in the low-autonomy group).  
(b) In each model, the sample was divided into two segments based on hourly wages. High-wage earners are defined as workers who earn the average wage level or more among each of the groups of employees considered.  
***p <.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05   22 
Annex 
 
Annex Table 1: Working Time Preferences, Transition Matrix 2002 to 2003 
West German men N=5738 (Measure of working time preferences in both waves) 
  Part-time  Short Full-time  Standard FT  Long FT  Total 
Part-time   43  33  21  3  100 
Short Full-time  3  56  37  4  100 
Standard Full-time  1  13  73  13  100 
Long Full-time  1  6  37  56  100 
Distribution  3  22  57  18  100 
East German men N=1580 (Measure of working time preferences in both waves) 
  Part-time  Short Full-time  Standard FT  Long FT  Total 
Part-time   20  33  27  20  100 
Short Full-time  4  52  41  3  100 
Standard Full-time  1  10  78  11  100 
Long Full-time  1  4  38  57  100 
Distribution  2  18  63  17  100 
West German women N=4194 (Measure of working time preferences in both waves) 
  Part-time  Short Full-time  Standard FT  Long FT  Total 
Part-time   84  11  5  0  100 
Short Full-time  18  61  19  2  100 
Standard Full-time  7  21  67  5  100 
Long Full-time  5  14  40  41  100 
Distribution  43  28  26  3  100 
East German women N=1354 (Measure of working time preferences in both waves) 
  Part-time  Short Full-time  Standard FT  Long FT  Total 
Part-time   63  29  8  0  100 
Short Full-time  7  69  24  1  100 
Standard Full-time  1  24  71  4  100 
Long Full-time  4  7  56  33  100 
Distribution  11  44  42  3  100 
Sample: employees age 20-60; part-time: preferences for less than 30 hours per week; short full-time: preferences for between 30 and less than 37 hour per 
week; standard full-time: preferences for between 37 and 40 hours per week, and long full-time: preferences for more than 40 hours per week.  
 
 
Annex Table 2: Working Time Preferences 1993 to 2003 (measure of WTP in at least five waves)
  
  Mean  Standard Deviation  N 
    Overall  Between  Within  observations  N 
WG men  38.4  6.2  4.4  4.6  14,820  2,002 
EG men  39.7  7.0  4.6  5.3  5,307  730 
WG women  29.5  9.6  7.8  5.7  8,434  1,194 
EG women  34.6  7.6  4.9  5.8  4,099  552 
Sample: employees age 20-60 
  
Annex Table 3: Pooled OLS and Mundlak-type random effects estimates – interaction effects of wages and job 
quality with sex, West and East Germany, 1993-2003 
West Germany  East Germany 
 
POLS  Mundlak  POLS  Mundlak 
Female  -11.47***  -10.14***  -5.71***  -5.45*** 
Hourly wage  -.24***  -.26***  -.31***  -.35*** 
Mean hourly wage (time average)    .13**    .05 
Female*hourly wage  .11  -.12**  .01  -.03 
Occupational autonomy  .57***  .15
a  .51***  .21 
Mean occupational autonomy (time average)    .63***  .35  .45* 
Female* occupational autonomy  .87***  1.03***    .33 
Observations  35557  35557  11402  11402 
Respondents   10966  10966  3181  3181 
R-squared  .31  .31  .12  .12 
Test for significance of mean shares     sig.    sig. 
***p<0.001; **p< 0.01; *p<0.05; 
a p< 0.07 / Controls: age, sector of activity (public or private), time with same employer (job tenure in years), 
presence of partner, number and age distribution of children (as in Table 36), household income not earned by the respondent (non-labour wage 
income) and health status and the mean shares of these variables (time-average for each worker)   23 
 
Annex Table 4: Pooled OLS and Mundlak-type random effects estimates – interaction effects of wages and job 
quality with residence in either East or West Germany, by sex, 1993-2003 
male  female 
 
POLS  Mundlak  POLS  Mundlak 
East Germany  .82  1.01*  6.49***  6.37*** 
Hourly wage  -.34***  -.28***  -.08  -.41*** 
Mean hourly wage (time average)    -.09    .29*** 
East Germany*hourly wage  .01  -.03  -.18
a  -.06 
Occupational autonomy  .73***  .34***  1.03***  .71*** 
Mean occupational autonomy (time average)    .58***    .70*** 
East Germany*occupational autonomy  -.22  -.19  -.12  -.42* 
Observations  27386  27386  19573  19573 
Respondents   7763  7763  6281  6281 
R-squared  .03  .03  .24  .25 
Test for significance of mean shares     sig.    sig. 
***p<0.001; **p< 0.01; *p<0.05; 
a p< 0.07 / Controls: age, sector of activity (public or private), time with same employer (job tenure in years), 
presence of partner, number and age distribution of children (as in Table 36), household income not earned by the respondent (non-labour wage 




Annex Table 5: Fixed effects estimates – the effects of German employees’ occupational status on their working 
time preferences (without controlling for earnings power in terms of hourly wages), 1993-2003  
West Germany  East Germany 
men  women  men  men 
 
preferred  actual  preferred  actual  preferred  actual  preferred  actual 
Occupational autonomy  .32***  1.09***  .75***  1.70***  .27  1.00***  .22  1.35*** 
Observations  24381  24035  16528  16190  7125  7025  5813  5726 
Respondents   6831  6777  5245  5195  1869  1855  1592  1590 
R-squared  .01  .01  .06  .12  .01  .01  .03  .03 
F-Test  3.63***  6.02***  4.75***  7.60***  3.29***  5.61***  3.21***  6.73*** 
Year dummy variables are included in each procedure but not reported.  Further covariates include age, job tenure, sector of activity (pubic versus 
private), number and age distribution of children, non-labour income and health status. / ***p <.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05 
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i Acknowledging that households are important decision making units, however, we view this trade-off in the 
context of household strategies. From this point of view, households have a target income that their members 
aim to generate in gainful employment. Personal target incomes of men and women in coupled households and 
their unpaid work loads operating as time constraints to employment are then a function of the gender division of 
breadwinning roles practised.  
ii Empirical evidence for an upward-sloping labour supply curve in the region of lower wages, is typically argued to 
reflect  utility-maximising  behaviour  in  response  to  wage  increases  (‘substitution  effect’).  In  contrast  to  this 
reasoning, we argue that a positive relation between wage changes and working hours is plausibly due to hours 
constraints set by employers in the sense that workers who face a wage cut plausibly also face a reduction in 
demand (e.g. their opportunities to perform paid overtime work may diminish). 
iii There are many arguments that can be raised against needs hierarchy theory, including the claim that it is rather 
difficult to test because of conceptual ambiguities and difficulties with operationalising its central concepts (Gibson & 
Teasley 1973; Wicker et al. 1993; Haslam et al. 2000). However, in spite of the conceptual criticisms of the theory, 
need hierarchy theory is commonly referred to in applied research, as it has proven to be very useful in generating 
ideas and in explaining diverse research findings. The rationale for choosing need hierarchy theory as part of our 
theoretical framework to explore which factors people take into consideration when forming their working time 
preferences is simple: given that we aim to explore employees’ reactions to the core dimensions of their jobs an 
obvious  choice  would  be  Hackman  and  Oldham’s  (1976;  1980)  job  characteristics  model  of  work  motivation. 
However, while his model can be used to predict that certain job characteristics will elicit work motivation, it does not 
specify the conditions under which this will be the case. Need hierarchy theory, by contrast, is a dynamic theory of 
motivation that provides us with theoretical predictions about the conditions under which one need is likely to prevail 
over  another  in  driving  work-related  behaviour.  Therefore,  it  is  chosen  as  a  logical  framework  and  source  of 
inspiration  in  the  attempt  to  combine  economic  theories  of  labour  supply  with  the  claim  that  under  certain 
circumstances (e.g. absence of income deprivation) other factors than wages and income, such as the strive for 
personal growth, may become the main sources of work motivation. 
iv The self-employed are excluded, because their working times are not monitored or legally regulated. Those 
working in the agricultural sector are excluded because farm workers often have variable schedules. 
v There is an important caveat to the target income hypothesis: the target income that individuals aim to generate 
in employment may not be fixed but increase over time due to ever increasing levels of aspirations (Altman 
2001).  Hence,  in  the  event  that  people’s  target  income  tends  to  increase  with  their  earnings  power,  wage 
increases may have a weak if any effect on preferred hours. At all events, even if this should be that case, wage 
decreases can still be assumed to trigger reductions in preferred work hours, especially among low-paid workers 
who face a strong pressure to maintain their current level of total income. Indeed, under the assumption of loss 
aversion  (e.g.  Götte et al.  2004),  wage decreases can  generally be assumed to have a stronger  effect on 
preferred hours than wage increases.  
vi When pooling the sample of East and West German workers in order to test for the statistical significance of 
regional  differences  in  the  strength  of  job  quality  effects,  while  controlling  for  hourly  wages,  the  difference 
between East and West Germany turned out to be significant among female but not male employees (Mundlak-
type model). This suggests that the difference between West and East German men with regard to the effect of 
job quality on preferred hours is due to compositional effects (i.e. a higher share of low-wage workers in East 
Germany), while this is not the case among women. Indeed, irrespective of wage levels, West German women 
turned out to most strongly respond to improvements in terms of job quality, when compared to their male but 
also when compared to their East German counterparts, see Annex Tables 3 and 4). 